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MACROECONOMETRIC  analysis of labor-force participation  rates has 
concentrated  on quarterly  variations  of these rates  and their  relationship 
with  the short-run  business  cycle. Cyclical  changes  in unemployment  rates 
are assumed  to cause changes  in participation  rates as workers  become 
discouraged  in their  search  and drop  out of the labor  force;  while  longer- 
run  effects  tend  to be subsumed  in a general  trend  variable  or variables. 
I shall  argue  that  the omission  from  the analysis  of variables  that  reflect 
intermediate  swings  in labor-force  participation  rates  arising  from demo- 
graphic  factors lends an unwarranted  significance  to short-run  cyclical 
factors  and the time trend.  These demographic  variables  provide  the key 
to the main  puzzle  in the behavior  of participation  rates  over the postwar 
period-that is, the tendency  for participation  rates  of younger  and older 
women  to grow  rapidly  at different  points  in time.  For example,  in a sem- 
inal demographic  study in 1968, Richard  A. Easterlin  wrote that "the 
most  challenging  recent  observation  calling  for explanation  is the remark- 
able rise in the rates  of older  women" (emphasis  added).' According  to 
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the more  recent  data,  the story  has been reversed.  The participation  rates 
of females  45 and  over,  after  rising  strongly  between  1948 and 1963, have 
risen marginally  since then. For young women, a flat trajectory  of par- 
ticipation  rates  prior  to 1960 has been replaced  by a steeply  rising  trend 
since  then.  The  payoff  now is in explaining  this  latter  development  and  the 
reversal  of the age  groups  with  dynamic  growth  in participation. 
The notion that the recent sharp increase in participation  rates of 
younger  females can be "explained"  by trend  variables  may convey the 
impression  that  the economic  experience  of this  cohort  has otherwise  been 
similar  to that  of older  cohorts.  This,  however,  is not the case. Indeed,  the 
groups  with  the strongest  upward  trends  of late are  the cohorts  born  in the 
baby  boom  of the late 1940s and  early  1950s. 
My hypothesis  is that the main explanation  of changes  in the partici- 
pation  rates  of women  involves  these changes  in the age structure  of the 
population  and associated  relative-income  effects, factors that fluctuate 
with an intermediate  rather  than a short  frequency.  The line of causality 
runs as follows: The entrance  of the baby-boom  cohort into the labor 
market  swelled the supply  of young workers;  that in turn led to a steep 
relative  decline  in wages and living  standards  for young  people;  and that 
adversity  led to the drop  in fertility  rates  and spurred  the rise  in participa- 
tion of younger  women.  This model is hereafter  denoted  the relative-in- 
come  model. 
In this model,  workers  have a desired  or anticipated  standard  of living, 
W*,  that  is formed  by the  past  experience  of their  own cohort  plus  the con- 
temporaneous  conditions facing other age cohorts. When their own 
current  income, W, is low relative  to W*, additional workers, especially 
second  wage  earners  in the family,  enter  the labor  market  in order  to help 
achieve  the desired  standard.  Since  the end of World  War  II, fluctuations 
in the relative  income  of a cohort  have been inversely  related  to changes 
in that  cohort's  relative  size in the  population  structure. 
The recent increase  in participation  rates of younger  women is thus 
not a spontaneous  event associated  with a newfound  freedom.  Rather, 
it is largely  a result  of their  being  part  of an unprecedentedly  large  cohort, 
which  has  experienced  a marked  decline  in relative  earnings.  In an attempt 
to alleviate  this misfortune,  younger  women  have been flooding  into the 
labor  market. 
These  same  factors  also  help explain  the  participation  behavior  of older 
females.  For example,  the recent  slowdown  in the growth  of their  partici- Michael L. Wachter  547 
pation  rates  is due to the replacement  of the cohort  that first  entered  the 
labor market  during  the Great Depression  by the mothers  of the baby 
boom.  Thus,  the current  cohort  of older  workers  is a relatively  small  group 
that has experienced,  throughout  its life cycle, relatively  high family  in- 
come  that  could  be maintained  without  two  wage  earners. 
The participation  rates of women  have been rising steadily  since the 
turn of the century.  There may well be a long-run  trend in these rates 
based on sociological factors, or even some recent increase in such a 
trend.  The argument  offered  here is that there are important  variations 
around  such a trend  that are associated  largely  with intermediate  swings 
in demographic  events. 
To explore these matters,  this paper  is organized  along the following 
lines: The first section discusses the justification  of the discouraged- 
worker  model,  the  prevailing  model  of participation  behavior  in the litera- 
ture.  The second  section  introduces  the relative-income  model  and  the age 
structure  of the population  as an intermediate-swings  variable.  The third 
section  presents  the empirical  tests of the intermediate-swings  equations. 
The fourth  section  focuses  on the implications  that the various  equations 
have for the discouraged-worker  effect. The final section utilizes the 
alternative  specifications  to forecast  changes  in participation  rates. 
The Discouraged-Worker  Model 
It is generally  considered  that participation  rates are significantly  and 
negatively  related  to short-run  cyclical  swings  in the unemployment  rate.2 
As unemployment  increases,  some  potential  workers  become  discouraged 
and  drop  out of the  labor  force;  that  is, 
(1)  LFPR, =  f(U. T,. LFPR1_,).  fu  < 0. 
2.  For the most recent treatment, see George L. Perry, "Potential Output and 
Productivity,"  BPEA, 1:1977, pp. 11-47. For an early treatment  of the discouraged- 
worker model, see Alfred Tella, "The Relation of Labor Force to Employment," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 17 (April 1964), pp. 454-69. The pro- 
cyclical sensitivity of the labor force is also stressed  by the researchers  at the Urban 
Institute, using gross-flow data. See, for example, Ralph E. Smith, "A Simulation 
Model of the Demographic  Composition  of Employment,  Unemployment,  and Labor 
-Force Participation,"  in Ronald G. Ehrenberg,  ed., Research in Labor Economics 
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where  LFPR, is the participation  rate of the ith group,  U is an aggregate 
unemployment  rate, Ti is the time trend(s)  for the ith group, and 
LFPRt  -  i is a lagged  dependent  variable  operating  as a distributed-lag 
generator. 
The hypothesis  is that fu < 0 captures  the discouraged-worker  effect. 
This effect  is open to different  interpretations.  In the traditional  discour- 
aged-worker  model, the dropouts  are a reserve  army  of Keynesian  unem- 
ployment,  even though  they report  themselves  as being out of the labor 
force.  These individuals  are willing  to work  regularly  at going  wage  rates 
and  are  not actively  seeking  work  only because  jobs are  not available.  On 
this interpretation  the unemployment  count is presumed  to understate 
the available  labor  supply  by the number  of discouraged  workers. 
Alternatively,  workers  may leave the labor market  because market 
wages are temporarily  low relative  to their  reservation  wage. A decrease 
in employment  may lower the real or perceived  market  wage faster  than 
the reservation  wage, which  is linked  more closely to noncyclical  factors 
such as the level of public  assistance  or the value attached  to leisure.  In 
this case, the workers  who leave the labor  force as a result  of the drop  in 
aggregate  demand  are not a hidden  reserve  of labor  inputs  at the current 
array  of wages and prices.  Rather,  they are correctly  measured  as being 
out of the labor force and should not be included  in the unemployment 
statistics. 
The time-trend  variable  is also open to differing  interpretations.  For 
some researchers,  trend variables  capture the century-long  shift from 
home work  to market  work  on the part  of women.  In the Becker-Mincer 
model, the increased  supply  of market  work  is due to the increased  rela- 
tive productivity  of market  work over home work or the lower income 
elasticity  of demand  for home-produced  goods compared  with market- 
produced  goods.3  As wage  rates  have  risen  and  have  raised  family  income 
and  the "cost"  of time,  families  have  shifted  their  consumption  away  from 
the relatively  time-intensive  goods that are produced  in the home by 
family  members  toward  market  goods with a low relative  time cost. This 
3.  Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," Economic Journal, 
vol. 75 (September 1965), pp. 493-517,  and Jacob Mincer, "Market  Prices, Oppor- 
tunity Costs, and Income Effects," in Carl F. Christ and others, Measurement in 
Economics: Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics in Memory of 
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has induced  family  workers,  traditionally  the females,  to shift their  work 
from  the  home  to the  market. 
Other  economists  and most demographers  prefer  a less neoclassical, 
more sociological, explanation of  participation  trends, especially the 
marked  acceleration  since  the late 1960s. Such  an approach  may empha- 
size the exogenous  change  in tastes  associated  with the "women's  move- 
ment."  This view has some appeal since no earlier  model successfully 
predicted  the sharp  upswing  in the trend  rate of growth  of female par- 
ticipation. 
The most recent  estimate  of the discouraged-worker  model  is provided 
by Perry.  He used two time trends,  with the second  beginning  in 1967, to 
capture  the longer-run  influences  and the sharp  acceleration  in participa- 
tion  of young  women  in the 1960s.  The participation  rates  estimated  by the 
U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  were  adjusted  for several  factors,  using,  in 
particular,  Denison's  method  of converting  household  data on the labor 
force  to establishment  data.  Using  Perry  weighted  unemployment  in place 
of measured  unemployment  resulted  in equations  of the form' 
(2)  LFPRi  =  f(Up,  T, T67), 
where UV  is Perry  weighted  unemployment  and T is a continuous  time 
trend  while T67 is a second  time trend  that begins  in 1967. Here and in 
all subsequent  equations  the dependent  variable  was  the natural  logarithm 
of LFPR. For the periods  1949-75 and 1954-75, Perry  found  significant 
coefficients  for most  variables  for each age-sex  group. 
The strength  of the estimated  discouraged-worker  effect varies with 
the data set. I reestimated  these equations,  using the household series 
revised  to account  for the 1967 change  in definitions,  for both annual  and 
quarterly  data.5  The annual  model  is estimated  for 1949-76 in the form 
(3)  LFPRi = f(Up,  T, T67, LFPRt_.,i), 
4.  Perry, "Potential Output." 
5. My revision of the data for the 1967 change in definition  relies on Robert L. 
Stein, "New Definitions for Employment and Unemployment," Employment and 
Earnings, vol.  13 (February 1967),  pp. 3-27.  Although the  1967 revision affects 
unemployment rates significantly, its effect on labor-force participation is less im- 
portant. Stein has suggested that, since any specific revision was arbitrary  and not 
based on significant  differences  in the data, he favored the unrevised  series. The equa- 
tions were estimated using both the revised and published BLS data, and the differ- 
ences between the two sets of results were small. I used the revised data in the tables 
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and is shown  in table 1.6  The discouraged-worker  effect  is generally  less 
significant  and  has  a smaller  coefficient  than  Perry  found.7 
Whether  the establishment  data or the household  data are appropriate 
depends  upon the issue being investigated.  My concentration  is on the 
unemployment  issue so that the household  data are most useful. Given 
Perry's  concern  with  potential  output,  a conversion  to establishment-based 
data  was desirable.  Hereafter,  the results  are  reported  only for the house- 
hold participation  series (revised  for the 1967 change  in definitions). 
Regardless  of the specification,  the time trends  are plainly important 
independent  variables  and  the  broken  time  trend  always  improves  the per- 
formance  of the equation.  Although trends  help the equation  fit better 
over the sample period, they do not convey information  on the actual 
mechanism  generating  the change.  Would  an ongoing  women's  movement 
imply  that  the next  cohort  of young  women  will take  on the rate  of change 
or the level of the participation  rate  of the current  cohort?  Will the young 
women  carry  their  labor-market  attachment  with  them  as they  age,  thereby 
causing  the participation  rates of older women  to increase  rapidly?  The 
trend variables  of equation  3 extrapolated  into the future suggest con- 
tinued  rapid  supply  increases  for young  women,  but little change  in par- 
ticipation  for older  workers.  That  implies  that  the  women's  movement  will 
have an increasing  influence  on young  women,  but that  they  will drop  out 
of it when  they  age.  This  view  has obvious  drawbacks. 
The above structure  should incorporate  variables that contain in- 
6.  For younger men, the size of the armed forces divided by total civilian non- 
institutional population is included as an additional explanatory  variable. This pro- 
cedure is needed because the dependent variable is the civilian labor force, while 
increases in the armed forces are drawn largely from young males in the labor force 
rather  than in school or at home. 
7.  Rather than using a lagged dependent variable, Perry adjusted his equations 
for  autocorrelation using a first-order Cochrane-Orcutt  scheme. As  a result, the 
"long-run"  discouraged-worker  coefficients are open to different interpretations.  I 
also estimated the various equations using the Cochrane-Orcutt  adjustment  in place 
of the lagged dependent variables, and the overall results were largely unchanged. 
Several variants on equation 3 were estimated. These included using regular unem- 
ployment, long-duration  unemployment,  and my UGAP series (a measure of labor- 
market  tightness  defined  in Michael L. Wachter,  "The  Changing  Cyclical Responsive- 
ness of Wage Inflation,"  BPEA, 1:1976, p. 126). Inflation variables were also only 
moderately successful in  capturing a short-run cyclical response of  participation 
rates.  Using quarterly  data for the period 1954-76 revealed a significant  discouraged- 
worker effect. In this case, the unemployment variable was introduced with a long 
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formation  on the changes  in cohorts in each age group over time. For 
example,  the current  group of workers  aged 20 to 24 are from the un- 
usually large baby-boom  cohort. Ten years from now, that cohort will 
have moved up the age structure  and the 20-to-24 population  will be 
drawn  from  the  beginnings  of the "baby  bust"  generation. 
Cohort-Effect  Variables 
The next two sections  introduce  into the participation  equations  vari- 
ables  that  contain  cohort  information.  The first  summarizes  the age struc- 
ture of the working-age  population.  The specific variable  used here is 
the percentage  of persons  aged 16 to 34 relative  to the total civilian  popu- 
lation aged 16 and over (RPy).8 It is introduced  into the participation 
equation  in place  of T67; that  is, 
(4)  LFPRi  =f  (Up,  Ti, RPy, LFPR t-1, i). 
Such a variable  is based on the assumption  that the various age-sex 
groups  are  imperfect  substitutes  for one another.  Young  workers  and  new 
entrants  into the labor  market  in general  lack specific  training  and there- 
fore cannot  compete  effectively  with  prime-age  males,  who have acquired 
this training  as a consequence  of their  ongoing  labor-market  attachment. 
An imbalance  of young  workers  resulting,  for example,  from  the entry  of 
the baby-boom  cohorts  into the labor force, has a twofold effect. First, 
as a consequence  of relatively  fixed  factors  of production  in the short  run 
and imperfect  relative-wage  adjustments,  possibly due to the minimum 
wage and government  transfer  payments,  the younger  cohorts  and most 
female groups suffer an increase in relative unemployment  rates.9 
Second, although  relative  wages are not flexible enough to clear the 
market,  they are not perfectly  rigid. The result is a decrease  in hourly 
wage rates for secondary  workers;  and ceteris paribus, a decrease in 
family income. The mechanism  through  which changes  in wages or in- 
come  affect  participation  I call  the relative-income  effect. 
8. In ibid., the numerator  was individuals between the ages of  16 and 24. That 
variable did not work well for the participation  equations,  but the variable  used here 
is significant  in both the participation-rate  and labor-force equations. The two con- 
structs are very similar but are out of phase with each other by about five years. 
9.  This effect provided the basis of the UN  series reported  in ibid. g  C  t  o  x  o  ~~~~~~~~  o  ~~~  o  ~~~  o  ~C;  C  C 
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THE  RELATIVE-INCOME  MODEL 
The relative-income  model is relevant  to secondary  workers  and is 
based  on a type  of negative  income  effect  between  market  work  and  other 
activities,  especially  nonmarket  work;10  that is, the underlying  participa- 
tion  function  is of the form 
(5)  LFPRi = fi(Up, Ti, Wi W*),  fwilw*  < 0, 
where W is current  family income and W* is the anticipated  or desired 
level. The W* construct  is likely to be a function  of past own-family  in- 
come  and  the current  family  income  of other  age  groups: 
(6)  Witt =  AZ  ax$Wi,t_iq  E  ojwj,t)., 
where  the as and  ,s  are  weights,  and  the is refer  to a particular  group  and 
the js to other groups.  The first  term reflects  the own lagged aspiration 
effect  while the second  term  measures  the contemporaneous  influence  of 
"keeping  up  with  the other  cohorts." 
Although  relative-income  theory will be discussed  in terms of equa- 
tions 5 and 6, the empirical  results  are presented  in terms  of equation  4 
and  variations  on that  form,  for  reasons  discussed  below. 
The relative-income  model appears  to contradict  the cross-section  evi- 
dence  which shows participation  of women increasing  strongly  with re- 
spect to their real wage and decreasing,  but by a lesser magnitude,  with 
respect  to the wage of men. In fact, to the extent that the cross-section 
evidence  is at all relevant  to the time-series  data,  there  is no contradiction. 
First, the income and substitution  effects of the cross-section  data are 
especially  difficult  to estimate  in a time-series  context  in which  real  wages 
of both men and women  trace generally  upward  trends  with little inde- 
pendent  variation  between  them.  In terms  of equation  5 the cross-section 
wage  effects  must  be blended  into a single  term,  and  it makes  little differ- 
ence whether  this term  is a real-wage  or trend  term.  The finding  that  the 
trend  term  has a positive  sign for most female  groups  coincides  with the 
10. The relative-inrcome  model, as first applied to  fluctuations in labor-force 
participation,  was discussed in Michael L. Wachter, "A Labor Supply Model for 
Secondary  Workers,"  Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 54 (May 1972), pp. 
141-51. The model draws from Easterlin's  use of relative income to explain fertility 
swings, and from James S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving, and the Theory of Con- 
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cross-section  notion  that the own-wage  effects  of young  women  are posi- 
tive and are stronger  than  the negative  effect  of their  spouse's  wage."1 
Second,  the relative-wage  effect, W/W*, is not directly  related  to the 
cross-section  evidence.  There  is an explicit  assumption  that  tastes  are  reg- 
ularly  changing  over time.  Individuals  and  families  do not react  simply  to 
the level of wages, but rather  to the actual  level relative  to their aspira- 
tions. Although  aspirations  are measured  by an economic  variable,  W*, 
wage  effects  on participation  rates  involve  both the influence  of tastes  and 
shifts in the budget constraint.  The a priori  notion of the relative-wage 
theory  is that family income, which is closely but not solely associated 
with the primary  worker's  wage, is dominant.  The basic hypothesis  is 
that a decline in W, for a constant  W*, causes secondary  workers  to 
switch  from  home  or school  work  to market  work  in order  to maintain  the 
family's  standard  of living. 
The overall  impact  of the secondary  worker's  wage is more complex. 
I have argued  elsewhere  that  the impact  should  differ  among  age groups, 
being negative for younger  women and positive for older ones.'2 For 
younger  women,  the own-wage  supply  curve-for  a given  level of W*- 
is backward  or negatively  sloped. Short-run  downswings  (upswings) in 
W, for given W*, cause an increase  (decrease) in participation  rates.  On 
the other hand, steady-state  increases  in W, where W =  W*, cause a 
movement  up  the  long-run  positively  sloped  supply  curve. 
For the current  period,  the W/W* effect  predicts  a ceteris  paribus  in- 
crease  in the participation  rate  of young  women  and  a decrease  in the rate 
for older  workers.  Since  the unbalanced  age structure  stemming  from  the 
baby boom depresses  labor-market  conditions  for young and secondary 
workers in general, relative wages for both male and female young 
workers  decline.  Faced  with a drop  in W/W*, families  respond  by reduc- 
ing completed  family  size and shifting  the secondary  worker  from home 
work  to market  work.'" 
11. It is recognized that the wage effects of either the cross-section  or time-series 
data  are largely  concerned  with  the  interoccupational  decision  between  market  and 
home work. Since it is usually difficult to separate leisure from home work in the 
available data, the wage effect captures  an amalgam of the choice between work and 
leisure and that between market and home work. 
12. The differences reflect life-cycle effects associated with changing needs for 
time and money associated with such factors as child rearing. See Wachter, "Labor 
Supply Model." 
13. The reduction in the earnings prospects of young people also results in an 
increase in the proportion  of the nonmarried  which similarly increases  the participa- 
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Table  2. Median  Income  of Full-Time,  Year-Round  Male Workers,  by Age, Relative 
to Males 45-54, Selected  Years  1955-75 
Age group  1955  1960  1965  1970  1973  1975 
14-19  0.4159a  0.3476  0.3592b  0.3977  0.3752  0.3820 
20-24  0.7331  0.6897  0.6882  0.6701  0.5858  0.5754 
25-34  0.9593  0.9598  0.9557  0.9189  0.8878  0.8628 
35-44  1.0049  1.0403  1.0524  1.0329  1.0120  0.9947 
45-54  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
55-64  0.8816  0.8945  0.9196  0.9134  0.9194  0.9129 
65 and over  0.6698  0.7247  0.7458  0.6801  0.6995  0.7782 
Source: U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Current  Population Reports, Series P-60, "Money Income in [year] 
of Families and Persons in the United States" (Government Printing  Office),  various issues, and unpublished 
data. 
a.  The 1950 data are used for males 14-19 because no value is reported for 1955. 
b. The 1964 data are used for males 14-19 because of obvious measurement  problems with the 1965 data 
For older women, the income picture has been more favorable than it 
has been for younger ones. Their own wage and unemployment experience 
may be somewhat unfavorable, because a certain percentage have slight 
labor-market attachment and hence  are substitutes for young workers. 
However, their family income is maintained by the favorable market con- 
ditions for prime-age men. An improved labor market for their spouses 
coupled with the slack market for their own labor is likely to  depress, 
ceteris paribus, the participation rate of older women. 
THE  RELATIVE-WAGE  DATA 
That young workers and their families have suffered a strong decline in 
relative family income is exhibited in tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows the 
earnings of men who worked full time, year-round relative to those  of 
men aged 45-54,  while table 3 indicates relative family income for the 
various age groups measured against families whose head is 45-54.  The 
members of the baby boom begin to enter the labor force in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s and the drop in relative earnings of young workers and 
families is dramatic. These two sets of data illustrate different parts of the 
story of the decline of relative income of younger people. Since the data 
in table 2 exclude those who suffered any significant bouts of unemploy- 
ment and those who work either part time or full time only part of the 
year it focuses specifically on deterioration in relative hourly or full-time 
earnings. For men 14-19,  the decline in relative earnings is very slight; 
most  of the labor-market deterioration for this group has shown up in in- os  t  b  cn  ~~~~. 
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creased  unemployment.  For men 20-24,  the decline in relative  income 
between 1955 and 1975 is from 0.73 to 0.58. In other  words,  while the 
average  20-24-year-old earned almost three-fourths  of what a 45-54- 
year-old  worker  earned  in 1955, he earned  only slightly  more  than  half as 
much  as in 1975. Men 25-34 have also experienced  a significant  decline 
between  1955 and 1975 whereas  the earnings  of all other  groups  of men 
have held steady  or increased  relative  to those of the benchmark  group.'4 
For young  families  in general,  as distinct  from  individuals,  income  has 
also  declined  as a percentage  of income  of families  whose  head  is 45 to 54 
(table 3). For example,  between  1957 and 1975, relative  family  income 
of those 14 to 24 years of age declined  from 0.70 to 0.50. For families 
whose head was 25 to 34, the decline  was from  0.92 to 0.78. Since  these 
data are for families,  they are responsive  to the effect  of relative  unem- 
ployment  shifts  and  the increase  in households  with  female  heads.  On the 
other hand, they also indicate  that the increase  in two-earner  families, 
which has been concentrated  in younger  families,  has not been sufficient 
to offset  the deterioration  in labor-market  conditions  for young  workers. 
Young  families  with  two wage  earners  have managed  to soften  the decline 
in relative  income,  but  they  have  not managed  to reverse  it. 
These data support  the relative-income  model and the key exogenous 
role of a variable  like RPy. First,  the timing  of the decline  in relative  in- 
come for young workers  coincides  with the entrance  of the baby bulge 
into the labor market,  starting  in the late 1950s. For example,  for most 
young  families,  income  relative  to that of families  headed  by a man aged 
45 to 54 rose between  1947 and 1957 (table 3). The decline  in the rela- 
tive earnings  (and the increase  in unemployment  rates) of young  people 
has not been a long-term  development,  but appears  to correspond  to the 
intermediate-term  swing  in the age structure  of the population.  Second, 
the increase  in participation  rates for female groups  is most marked  for 
young  people who experienced  declines  in their  own relative  income and 
14. The data for year-round,  full-time female workers indicate a decline for all 
age groups under 65 relative to men 45-54.  Here again, however, the declines are 
most marked for younger women. This indicates that the baby-boom generation of 
younger workers has caused a general imbalance in the labor market for all secon- 
dary workers. Some of these points are also discussed  by Robert J. Gordon, "Struc- 
tural Unemployment  and the Productivity  of Women,"  in Karl Brunner  and Allan H. 
Meltzer, eds., Stabilization of the Domestic and International  Economy, Camegie- 
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 5 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 
1977), pp. 181-229. Michael L. Wachter  559 
their  family's  relative  income.  Older  women,  with  steady  or rising  relative 
family  income,  have  increased  their  participation  rates  only slightly. 
The RPy variable  is used for estimation  purposes  rather  than any of 
the direct  relative-income  measures  for several reasons: First, whereas 
relative  income  is endogenous,  RPy  is exogenous  to the  participation  equa- 
tion; that  is, the fall in relative  income  induces  greater  participation,  but 
these  increases  in the labor  supply,  in turn,  affect  relative  income.  Second, 
the construction  of an appropriate  relative-income  variable,  involving  both 
contemporaneous  comparisons  across  age  groups  and  lagged  comparisons 
on past own behavior,  poses a conceptual  problem.  It is complicated  by 
the fact that  the data series  are  not long enough  to permit  the inclusion  of 
past income for each age-sex  group.  Finally, not only is RPy  exogenous 
but its values  through  1985 are known  with some certainty.  Since  an im- 
portant  purpose  of this paper  is to analyze  alternative  forecasts  of future 
participation  rates,  knowledge  of the likely  future  course  of RPY  is useful. 
The Intermediate-Swings  Model 
Table 4 shows  the results  obtained  by replacing  the broken  trend  T67 
with RPy.  The equations  are  in annual  form  for the period 1949-76. The 
age-structure  variable  is significant  in ten of the fourteen  equations.  The 
R2S  of the equations  are  largely  unchanged,  while  the significance  level of 
Up  rises  for most  male  groups  and  falls  for most  female  groups. 
The RPy  variable  has a positive  coefficient  for men 16-24 and 65 and 
over, and  for women 16-44. In other  words,  this variable  resembles  T67 
in that  it has an identical  sign in the various  age-sex  equations.  I believe 
that  T67 in table  1 is acting  as a proxy  for  those  intermediate-swing  factors 
associated  with the entrance  of the baby-boom  cohorts into the labor 
market  during  the early 1960s. The RPy variable,  on the other hand, is 
open to broader interpretations  than the relative-income  mechanism. 
Most significantly,  the equations  of table 4 present  a much  different  pic- 
ture  of the coming  decade  from  those  of table 1, as I shall  show  below. 
SCHOOL  ENROLLMENT  AND  FERTILITY 
A number  of modifications  can be made to the equations  of table 4. 
First, school enrollment  can be added to the equations  for both young S  <  ^,0  >  R  F  n  o  W  F~00in  0 
CX  g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1 
m  R  t  s  S  n  o  o  o~~~~)  C  *ws  o  o  o  o  o  o  o~~~~;  C 
_  0  O  -  O  -  O  *?  9~~~~~~~~~~~1 
n  4  s  0~~~~~~~~~~O  0'S  00  ON  0  (ON  1  0 
W  t~~~~~~~~W 
.5~~~~~~~~~~~~~~W  C4  o  C-  o,  Cl  't  0  o 
} 
I  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,  I  0  I  N  I  I 
v  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~  n  oc  o  o  .  o  t 
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t  t- o0  .  o  W)  IT  ".  tn 
S d  t k  I  X  ~~~~~~~~~  1i  ll S4 
h  2  >  W  ^  $  n  t  u  W~~~C; o  tn  m  en  %O  V-4  'RT 
tn  (Y)  tn  00 
OA 'O.  C;  C;  C;  C;  C;  C;  r. 
to 0 
0  0 
-  r. 
o  Itt  Itt  00  t-  01,  > 
V-4  .5  00  09  g  V-4  C4  C4  cli  o 
1-4  'Att  00  00 
00  01,  ON  00  00  r-  > 
C;  C;  C;  C;  C; 
0 
tf)  10  %O  tn 
CD  oo  tr)  t,  oo  o  W)  en 
tn  ('  1  '  06  9  C  4  C 14  o  %..,  o  c)  o  %-.,  c) %-.,  o  1-1  C;  0  C)  A) 
0 
0 
tf)  -N  -1-  e-N  00  e-N  C's 
64  04  tr)  m  tr)  O'i 
0 
c)  CZ  CZ 
0V.  00 
CZ  0 
0  el,  0 
M 
CA  0  0c) 
WI C4  W!  C4  e  t-: 1-4  (:R  C  C! C  6  C  0,4,5: 
.0  C4  r-    - .. > 
tl-  0  I-N 
oo  OC)  eq  o  ON  W)  en  141'  t-  r-  (')  "t 
o  0,  V-4  en  tf)  N  tn  '..4  nt  OC)  VI 
09  C;  C  C;  IR  C;  C C' 
-0  U&.  C; 
O".  I 
(3N  tn  e--.  tn  e---.  ON  ll  r-  11-1  M:t  e---.  O  0> I.,    r-  V-0  00  M  1-4  t,  W)  00  en  00  M.-  O'i  tn  00  t-  en  00  00 
C  C'i  C  a 
0 
Cd  0  cq 
>  -o 
cd  o 
Cd  Cd Cd 
"D  cl  w  z  -  0 
Cd  Cd  to 
>  (n  z  cd  Cd 
..  a.2  r 
0 
E  Cd 
1'.  o  s. 
"C  =  Cd  I=  0 
Nr  Cc 
0 
.6  eQ  %L  W)  tn  tn  0  4  --4  cn  14t  tn  IC  410."  ir. 562  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
men and young women. In a purely accounting  sense these variables 
should have negative  signs since most individuals  tend to be either in 
school or in the labor  force.  Using  this  variable  introduces  obvious  simul- 
taneity  problems  since school enrollment  and participation  decisions  are 
likely  to be made  together.  Its value  is that, according  to past experience, 
it keeps projections  of participation  rates  compatible  with projections  of 
school enrollment.  The school-enrollment  variable  has a quantitatively 
significant  role in the participation  equations.  After growing  significantly 
prior to 1970, enrollment  rates have declined  for males 16-24 and fe- 
males 16-19 while  increasing  at a reduced  rate  for females  20-24.15 
Second,  the fertility  rate  can be added  to help, along  with  RPy,  in cap- 
turing  the influence  of intermediate  swings  in women's  participation  rates. 
This variable  is introduced  lagged  one year,  to capture  the overall  socio- 
economic  climate  of the relative-income  effect  that  may  underlie  the revo- 
lution  in the participation  rates  of women.  As Perry  has discussed,  partici- 
pation  rates  have increased  for women  who are having  children  as much 
as for those who are not having  children;  that  is, the fertility  rate cannot 
represent  simply  the shift to childless  families,  but rather,  represents  the 
amalgam  of effects  involved  in the movement  to smaller  families.  In gen- 
eral,  the large  cohort  of young  workers,  the drop  in their  income,  and  the 
decline in fertility  rates  are all part  of the intermediate-swings  phenome- 
non that  is correlated  with  the change  in participation  rates.', 
Different  fertility  variables  are entered  into the equations  for women, 
depending  upon  the age group.  For the groups  16-19, 20-24, and  25-34, 
15. I  would  argue that the  intermediate-swings  relative-income effect is  also 
behind the recent trends in school enrollment. For example, the very size of  the 
baby-boom cohort increases  the difficulties  that families have in financing  education. 
In addition, to the extent that education represents  a luxury consumption  good (as 
well as an investment good), the reduction in permanent  income depicted in tables 
2 and 3 would also result in a cutback  in education. 
16. Attempts were made to include a social security variable in the equations 
for older workers and the minimum wage in the equations for younger ones, but 
the results were insignificant. A  priori, it is unclear what direct effect minimum 
wages should have on participation rates. Empirically, Jacob Mincer, "Unemploy- 
ment Effects of Minimum Wages," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 84 (August 
1976, pt. 2),  pp. S87-S104, calculates a significant  negative effect; James F. Ragan, 
Jr., "Minimum Wages and the Youth Labor Market," Review of Economics and 
Statistics, vol. 59 (May 1977), pp. 129-36, finds no effect in either direction. Mini- 
mum wages have an important, but indirect effect on participation rates if  they 
increase the overall unemployment rate and shift more of the burden of unemploy- 
ment to teenagers. Michael  L. Wachter  563 
the age-specific  total  fertility  rate (TFR) is used,  lagged  one year.  For the 
older  groups,  the aggregate  total fertility  rate  is used, but it is introduced 
with a lag that  depends  upon age. The aim is to capture  the total fertility 
rate existing  at the time the females  were approximately  30 to 35 years 
of age and would have largely completed child bearing;  that is, the 
fertility  rate represents  a cohort-effect  variable  that reflects conditions 
existing  when  each  age  group  was  in its child-bearing  years. 
For younger  female  groups,  the anticipated  sign on the fertility  rate is 
clearly  negative.  For older groups,  a priori  restrictions  are less obvious. 
In large families,  once the children  are older, the costs of their rearing 
may  encourage  secondary  workers  to enter  the labor  market.  In this case, 
the sign on lagged fertility  for females 35 and over may be positive. 
Alternatively,  and more in the spirit of this model, the size of families 
reflects  labor-market  conditions  for the cohort  of the family  head. If, for 
example,  the current  cohort  of females  45-54 had large  completed  fami- 
lies, that would reflect  positive economic  factors at the time when they 
were  having  children.  As a consequence  of specific  training,  market  work 
is habit  forming,  and women  who do not work  when they are young are 
also  less likely  to work  when  they  are  older. 
The results,  including  all of the variables  whose coefficients  had a t 
ratio exceeding  unity, are shown  in table 5. The school-enrollment  vari- 
able clearly  improves  the specification  of the equations  for men aged 16- 
19 and 20-24.  The school-enrollment  variable  also improves  the fit of 
the equation  for women  aged 16-19. 
The total fertility  rate  has good results,  but suffers  somewhat  from the 
high degree  of collinearity  with the RPy term.  For women who are cur- 
rently in the midst of their child-bearing  years, 20-24  and 25-34,  the 
fertility  rate  works  better  than  RPy  and reduces  that variable  to insignifi- 
cance. For females 35-44, for whom the total fertility  rate is lagged ten 
years  to capture  the cohort  effect,  both TFR and  RPy  are significant.  For 
those aged 45-54  and 55-64, the RPy  variable  performs  slightly  better 
than TFR lagged twenty  and thirty  years, respectively.  Both can be in- 
cluded  in the equation  if one is lenient  in the requisite  confidence  interval. 
(In a quarterly  version  of table  5, TFR  improved  the fit of the equation  in 
place of RPI,,  in five of the seven equations  for females,  including  females 
45-54  and 55-64.)  For forecasting  purposes,  I have omitted  TFR from 
the equations  for females  45-54, but included  both variables  in the equa- 
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The workings  of the cohort effect through  TFR are neatly  illustrated 
by the 45-54 age group  of women.  Women  in this age group  during  the 
1950s had  been in their  child-bearing  years  during  the Great  Depression. 
The TFR&20  is therefore  falling and participation  rates are rising.  By the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, the 45-54  age group  is being populated  by 
the women  who had borne  the baby  boom. The sharp  increase  in TFRI2O 
explains  the ceteris  paribus  stability  of participation  rates among older 
groups  during  the recent  past. By the mid-1980s,  the baby-bust  mothers 
with their  low TFR-20 will be 45-54  and the participation  rates for this 
age  group  should  once again  increase. 
Although  there  can be some quarrel  with the particular  specifications 
of the equation  in table 5 or the interpretation  given  to specific  variables, 
I believe  that they indicate  the overwhelming  quantitative  importance  of 
the  intermediate-swings  variables  in the  participation  equations.  The revo- 
lution  in participation  rates  in the postwar  period  appears  to be described 
best  by the demographic  twist  in the  population  and  the associated  changes 
in fertility  rates  and  relative  income. 
The alternative  to the intermediate-swings  approach  for explaining 
noncyclical  movements  in participation  is the exogenous  sociological  ex- 
planation  for which time-trend  variables  serve as proxy.  The correct  ap- 
proach cannot  be ascertained  simply  by comparing  the R2s.  The model 
presented  in table  5 does  have  the advantage  of having  testable  hypotheses 
that  can lend themselves  to forecasting.  On the other  hand,  the sociologi- 
cal view associated  with the women's  movement  is more amorphous  and 
it does not pose obvious refutable  hypotheses.  Because the mechanisms 
underlying  the trend variables  are unknown,  extrapolating  trend-domi- 
nated  equations  into  the  future  is hazardous. 
An important  caveat  relevant  to the participation  equations  presented 
here is that they predict  1976 quite  poorly  and are likely to underpredict 
1977 by even more if the current  rate of growth  in the labor force con- 
tinues.  I conjecture  that  these  inadequacies  are  due  to the omission  of gov- 
ernment-policy  variables  concerning  transfer  payments.  Eligibility  for a 
number  of public-assistance  programs  has been altered  so as to require 
registration  for work. In addition,  the benefit  period  for unemployment 
compensation  has been lengthened during recent downturns.  These 
changes  may have increased  the number  of individuals  who report  them- 
selves  as being  unemployed  rather  than  out of the labor  force. Of course, 
the regulations  governing  public-assistance  programs  and  unemployment Michael  L. Wachter  567 
compensation  have  been altered  many  times  during  the past  generation  in 
ways that may have affected  participation,  and careful analysis  of this 
record  would be required  to isolate the quantitative  importance  of any 
recent  changes. 
Discouraged-Worker  Phenomenon 
Since  equations  for labor-force  participation  tend  to focus on the mag- 
nitude  of the discouraged-worker  effect,  it is useful to present  the aggre- 
gate effect from the equations  presented  in this paper. The results are 
shown  in table 6. For table 1, the equations  using  the broken  time trend 
indicate  a short-run  change  of the participation  rate of 0.26 percentage 
point  for a change  of 1 percentage  point  in the unemployment  rate.  Using 
RPy  in place of T67 reduces  this estimate  to 0.21. In table 5 the short- 
run elasticities  are even smaller.  The long-run  estimates  of the number  of 
discouraged  workers  assume  that  the Up  effects  grow  for three  years  as the 
short-run  effects  feed through  the lagged  dependent  variable.  Feedbacks 
lagged  beyond  the first  three  years  were  ignored  as it seemed  unrealistic  to 
assume  that  the process  went further.  Additional  tests of the general  par- 
ticipation equation suggest some caution in interpreting  the long-run 
effects  calculated  in this way. First, omitting  LFPRt-l  and adding  lagged 
Up  terms  frequently  resulted  in insignificant  lagged coefficients.  Second, 
when  the equations  of tables 1, 4, and 5 were  reestimated  using  the Coch- 
rane-Orcutt  scheme,  most coefficients  changed  little, and,  in this case, the 
overall  short-run  (and in this case total) discouraged-worker  effect  was 
under  0.26. 
The age-sex  composition  of discouraged  workers  is interesting.  First, 
in the short-run  effect  about  50 percent  are 16-19, and about  two-thirds 
are 16-24. It appears  that there are few discouraged  workers  over the 
age of 24. Since teenagers  tend to be located in the relatively  acyclical 
service  sector and have the least cyclically  sensitive  age-specific  unem- 
ployment  rates,  this result  is puzzling.'7  In part  this may reflect  the influ- 
ence that minimum  wages and government  transfer  policies have on the 
17. In Wachter, "Changing Responsiveness,"  the coefficient on the unemploy- 
ment rate for prime-age  men was 0.60 when men 16-19 were the dependent  variable 
and 0.38  when women  16-19  were the dependent variable. For both sexes, the 
teenage groups had the smallest coefficient on cyclical unemployment for any age- 
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Table 6. Size of the Labor  Force and Estimated  Number  of Discouraged  Workers, 
by Age-Sex Group,  Alternative  Models, 1976k 
Thousands 
Discouraged  workers 
Model  with  Model  with 
broken  time  trend  relative  population 
Sex and age 
group  Labor  force  Short run  Long runb  Short runi  Long runb 
Males 
16-19  4,832  151.15  301.64  137.26  441.80 
20-24  7,666  41.69  122.66  36.76  110.61 
25-34  14,383  24.36  56.20  34.40  50.61 
35-44  10,370  9.64  22.87  12.28  27.90 
45-54  10,322  3.59  9.31  10.45  25.97 
55-64  6,972  4.65  12.13  20.07  53.24 
65 and over  1,816  26.70  76.70  27.05  73.37 
Total  56,359  261.78  601.51  278.27  783.36 
Females, 
16-19  4,138  103.56  143.26  62.70  130.52 
20-24  6,280  28.74  78.42  28.56  39.97 
25-34  9,160  89.42  185.99  22.18  59.47 
35-44  6,801  43.15  90.40  26.37  77.59 
45-54  6,669  -4.45  -14.71  -13.20  -30.44 
55-64  4,308  -23.09  -61.55  1.54  3.93 
65 and over  1,058  -14.82  -25.27  -7.05  -10.36 
Total  38,414  222.51  396.54  121.10  270.68 
Total, male 
and female  94,773  484.29  998.05  399.37  1,054.04 
Increase  in participation 
rate, LFPR, from 1 
point change  in U  ...  0.26  0.53  0.21  0.56 
Sources: Based on the regression results of tables 1 and 4, above. Figures are rounded. 
a.  The numbers in the table are based on the assumption that weighted unemployment, Up, changes 
from 5.80 percent to 4.07 percent  (A  Up =  -1.73).  This change is (approximately)  comparable  to a 2 percent 
change in the unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
b.  The number for long-run discouraged workers is calculated as the sum of discouraged workers from 
period t through t-  3. See text. 
labor  market  for teenagers.  In particular,  since  many  auction  markets  are 
cut  off from  teenage  employment  because  of minimum  wages  and  because 
teenagers  are frequently  not eligible  for transfer  insurance,  these young 
workers  drop  out of the labor  force  rather  than  remain  in the ranks  of the 
unemployed.  In addition,  the voluntary  movement  between  school and 
market  work  makes  it difficult  to interpret,  for  policy  purposes,  the number 
of teenage  discouraged  workers. Michael  L. Wachter  569 
Second,  the  heavy  weighting  of teenagers  implies  a lower  effective  num- 
ber of discouraged  workers.  This follows from either  Perry's  efficiency 
rating  of workers  or my normalized  unemployment  rates ((Ul,,)  for the 
various  age-sex  groups."8 
Third,  the tendency  of the discouraged-worker  variable  to be more  sig- 
nificant  in the equations  for prime-age  men than in those for secondary 
workers sharply reverses the results of  previous discouraged-worker 
models.  As noted earlier  in connection  with the poor predictions  of these 
equations  for recent  years,  one may  conjecture  that  changing  government 
regulations  have  reduced  the cyclical  sensitivity  of secondary  workers  and 
that these recent  years  dominate  the regression  estimates.  For prime-age 
males the presence  of a significant  discouraged-worker  effect  may reflect 
an asymmetric  cyclical  response  for this group.  For males 25 and over, 
participation  rates have declined secularly, with the largest declines 
heavily  concentrated  in the older  groups.  The data  suggest  that  periods  of 
high  unemployment  speed  the secular  decline,  but that  participation  rates 
for these groups  do not recover  as the labor market  improves.  In other 
words,  high Up  hastens  exit from the labor market,  but low Up  does not 
uncover a reserve of unemployed.  If this interpretation  is correct, Up 
calculations  overstate  the true  pool of discouraged  workers,  especially  for 
older  male  workers. 
Forecasting  Participation  Rates 
Over  the past decade,  growth  in the labor  force  has been systematically 
greater  than expected  by the standard  equations  incorporating  a single 
historical  trend  plus discouraged-worker  effects.  In forecasting  participa- 
tion rates today there are two central questions.  First, will the overall 
rate continue growing at its very rapid recent pace? Second, will the 
growth  in aggregate  participation  rates  continue  to be due solely, or even 
largely,  to the  growth  in the  participation  of younger  females? 
To answer  these questions  I contrast  the forecasts  for 1981 and 1986 
implicit  in the equations  of table 5 with  the trend-dominated  equations  of 
table 1 and with simpler  trend-extrapolation  methods. The results are 
shown in table 7. To generate  the forecasts  in that table, I assume  that 
(1)  the trend values follow their predetermined  path, with the trend 
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Table 7. Labor-Force  Participation  Rates, 1976 Actual,  and 1981 and 1986 Projected 
1981  1986 
Dis-  Inter-  Dis-  Inter- 
1976  couraged-  mediate-  couraged-  mediate- 
worker  Extrapo-  swings  worker  Extrapo-  swings 
Sex and  Actual  model  lation  model  model  lation  model 
age group  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Males 
16-19  0.594  0.665  0.615  0.611  0.723  0.637  0.629 
20-24  0.852  0.866  0.857  0.852  0.874  0.861  0.851 
25-34  0.953  0.944  0.943  0.953  0.936  0.932  0.959 
35-44  0.955  0.947  0.944  0.952  0.939  0.934  0.953 
45-54  0.916  0.895  0.897  0.908  0.874  0.877  0.907 
55-64  0.745  0.683  0.690  0.720  0.626  0.635  0.719 
65 and 
over  0.203  0.179  0.165  0.179  0.159  0.126  0.155 
Females 
16-19  0.499  0.605  0.546  0.550  0.708  0.592  0.578 
20-24  0.650  0.750  0.715  0.675  0.868  0.780  0.690 
25-34  0.571  0.714  0.656  0.609  0.895  0.740  0.627 
35-44  0.578  0.651  0.632  0.627  0.736  0.686  0.660 
45-54  0.550  0.555  0.567  0.581  0.557  0.585  0.642 
55-64  0.411  0.381  0.403  0.420  0.352  0.396  0.456 
65 and 
over  0.083  0.070  0.075  0.081  0.061  0.068  0.085 
Sources: Column 1 is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Columns 2 and 5 are derived from the 
equations in table 1 above. Columins  4 and 7 are derived from the equations in table 5 above. Columns 3 
and 6 are estimated by projecting the growth rate in the past ten years (1967-76) for each sex-age group 
into the next ten years (1977-86). The rate of growth is assumed to be the same for each year. 
extrapolations  growing  over the next ten years at the rate set in the past 
ten years;19  (2)  the RPv variable  grows slowly between 1977 and 1980 
and then declines as predicted  by the Census  Bureau's  population  esti- 
mates;  (3) the fertility  variables  reverse  direction  and  grow  slowly,  attain- 
ing the levels implied  by zero population  growth  in 1981 and remaining 
constant  thereafter;  (4)  the school-enrollment  rates recover  from their 
recession  lows and  recoup  part  of their  loss by attaining  their  1972 values; 
(5) the armed  forces  remain  a constant  percentage  of the population;  and 
(6)  U. declines  to its 1972 value. 
19. The difference in forecasts between using a broken time trend and a single 
time trend is not significant  for most groups. Since the broken time trend fits much 
better over the estimation  period, I employ equation 3 as a counterpoint  to my equa- 
tions in table 5. The trend-extrapolation  method is not really the one used by Perry 
in  "Potential Output"; he  extended, for five years, the  average annual absolute 
increases  of the previous decade. Michael  L. Wachter  571 
The broken  time trend  projects  a large increase  in participation  rates 
for men 16-19 and  women 16-54. For most groups  of men and  for older 
women,  participation  rates are projected  to fall slightly.  These changes 
are magnified  if the equations  are run out to 1986 since, by that point, 
the discouraged  workers  are  all in the labor  force  and  the remaining  effect 
is a pure trend.  The projections  for equation  3 are shown  in columns  2 
and  5 of table  7,20 
The projections  for 1981 based  on my equations  are shown  in column 
4 of table 7. Given  the stress  on cohort  effects  and the aging  of the baby- 
boom cohort,  my equations  systematically  predict  relatively  slower  rates 
of labor-force  growth for younger women and faster rates for older 
women.  I also predict  slower  rates of growth  for men 16-24. For older 
men,  all models  continue  to project  very  moderate  declines. 
The differences  in the forecasts  of the broken-trend  and intermediate- 
swings  equations  are  highlighted  by examining  the groups  of women  aged 
25-34 and  45-54. The table  5 equations  forecast  a gain  of 3.8 percentage 
points  for the first  group  and a similar  3.1 point gain for the second.  The 
table 1 equations  indicate  a 14.3 point increase  for women  25-34  and a 
0.5 increase  for women  45-54. These differences  are further  accentuated 
in the 1986 forecast. 
The results  of the extrapolation  of the past ten years (1967-76)  into 
the next ten years (1977-86)  are shown  in columns  3 and 6 of table 7. 
Lacking  the extra  push of the broken  trend,  these forecasts  fall between 
the results  obtained  from  tables 1 and 5. They continue  to feature  rising 
rates  for  younger  men  and  women,  relatively  stable  rates  for older  women, 
and  falling  rates  for older  men. 
The key to explaining  the differing  time paths for younger  and older 
workers  lies in the intermediate-swings  variables  RPy and TFR. These 
generally  reduce the coefficient  on the time trend;  moreover,  while the 
trend  variables  continue  their  sample-period  path  into the forecast  period, 
both RPy and TFR break with their pre-1976 path. This captures  the 
aging  of the baby-boom  cohort.  By 1986 the vanguard  of the oversized 
20.  Trend models, of course, are not meant to be extrapolated over periods as 
long as ten years, and some users, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics, modify 
their trend model even for near-term  projections.  The BLS method is to calculate the 
average rate of growth over the past years and then to assume that that growth rate 
slowly approaches zero over the next twenty years. In other words, the trend is 
forced to zero. See Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., and Paul 0. Flaim, "New Labor Force 
Projections to  1990," Monthly Labor Review, vol. 99 (December 1976), pp. 3-13. 572  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1977 
Table  8. Projected  Change  in Total Labor  Force,  by Model, 1978-86 
Percent 
Discouraged- 
Intermediate-  worker  model 
swings  with  broken 
Year  model  time trend 
1978  2.04  2.39 
1979  2.05  2.50 
1980  1.81  2.36 
1981  1.75  2.41 
1982  1.60  2.18 
1983  1.54  2.07 
1984  1.46  1.97 
1985  1.40  1.93 
1986  1.45  1.99 
Sources: The projections  based on the intermediate-swings  model are from the equations of table 5, and 
those based on the discouraged-worker  model are from the equations of table 1. The assumptions under- 
lying the calculations are described  in the text. 
baby-boom  cohort,  with its high participation  rates,  will be entering  the 
45-54  age group. The young women of today will be middle-aged  and 
will not be returning  to the home. The more difficult  question  is whether 
the participation  rate  for younger  women  will level off. My assumption  is 
that the more  favorable  labor-market  experience  of the baby-bust  cohort 
will lead to an upturn  in the fertility  rate, and that although  the inverse 
relationship  between  market  work and number  of children  may weaken 
somewhat,  it will remain  strong.  The result  would then be a substantial 
slowdown  of the growth  rate  of participation  rates  from  their  current  high 
rate  of ascent.2l 
Although different  specifications  of the equations  and data sets pro- 
duce alternative  future  paths for the participation  rates, the two central 
distinctions  remain.  Intermediate-swings  models always produce lower 
participation  rates  for younger  workers  and higher  rates  for older work- 
ers. On  balance,  the net effect  is a reduction  in the anticipated  growth  rate 
of the aggregate  civilian  labor force. These results  are shown  in table 8. 
The trend-dominated  model projects a continued  growth of the labor 
force  of over 2 percent  per year  for the next ten years.  The intermediate- 
21. An important short-run, but insignificant  factor in the long-run forecasts is 
that the intermediate-swings  variables also reduce the estimate of the pool of dis- 
couraged  workers.  The projections  of participation  rates of table 7 are derived  solely 
from extrapolating  the equation of table 5. No judgmental  factors are included, al- 
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swings model, on the other hand, projects a persistent  slowdown of 
growth  from  2.04 percent  in 1978 to 1.45 percent  in 1986. 
The caveats that can be added to the story are numerous,  but two 
should  be stressed.  I assume,  first,  that government  transfer  policies  will 
not further  affect  participation  (or reported  participation)  in the labor 
force; and, second, that further  increases  in the immigration  rate will 
not significantly  offset  the aging  of the work  force due to the entrance  of 
the  baby-bust  cohort  into  the  labor  market.22 
Conclusion 
In most previous studies of labor-force  participation,  the stress has 
been on short-run  fluctuations  associated  with discouraged  workers,  with 
any remaining  variation  being explained  by a trend  variable.  The thrust 
of my argument  in this  paper  is that  that  approach  consigns  to an  unreveal- 
ing trend  the bulk of the fluctuations  in participation  rates  which can, in 
fact, be explained  systematically  by the intermediate-swings  and cohort 
variables.  In this context, the central  variables  become the relative-age 
structure  of the population  and total fertility  rates.  The latter are intro- 
duced  in lagged  form  to capture  the cohort  effect  and the conditions  pre- 
vailing when each age group was in its child-rearing  period. Including 
these variables  generally  reduces the significance  of the discouraged- 
worker  effect  and  the size of the  remaining  trend  component. 
The intermediate-swings  variables  represent  a kind of relative-income 
effect.  The influx  of the baby-boom  generation  has significantly  depressed 
the family  income  of young  people relative  to desired  standards  of living, 
which  are  based  on the income  of prime-age  men and previous  cohorts  of 
young  workers.  The result  has been a decrease  in fertility  and an increase 
in labor-force  participation  among  young  females  in an attempt  to main- 
tain desired  standards  of living.  For the youngest  workers,  school-enroll- 
ment  rates  also dropped  as these  workers  entered  the labor  market. 
A turning  point in American  economic-demographic  history  is a few 
years  away.  The baby-boom  generation  will begin  to enter  the prime-age 
groups  and  the baby-bust  generation  will begin  to enter  the labor  market. 
22. This discussion of future trends draws upon Michael L. Wachter and Susan 
M. Wachter, "The Fiscal Policy Dilemma: Cyclical Swings Dominated By Supply 
Side Constraints,"  in T. J. Espenshade  and W. I. Serow, eds., The Economic Conse- 
quences  of Slowing Population Growth (Academic Press, forthcoming). 574  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
I argue  that  this will lead to three  near-term  changes  in participation  be- 
havior.  First,  as the baby-boom  cohort  ages, it will raise  the participation 
rates  of the older age groups  that it enters  because  of its smaller  family 
size and  tradition  of high  participation  rates.  Second,  the new and  smaller 
cohort  of younger  workers  will enjoy an improving  labor market.  With 
less pressure  for two wage earners,  the participation  rate  for women  may 
return  to a path  for the growth  rate  much  lower  than  that  established  over 
the past decade.  Third,  combining  a faster  growth  rate for older women 
and a slower  growth  rate  for younger  ones with a nearly  steady  participa- 
tion rate  for prime-age  men results  in an overall  growth  rate  for the labor 
force that should  fall from over 2 percent  per year to approximately  1.5 
percent  in the early  1980s. 
Given  the record,  I do not expect  the forecasts  in tables  7 and 8 to be 
precise; the variables  that I have employed  include a mixture  of eco- 
nomic  and  sociological  factors  that are  difficult  to quantify  with accuracy. 
My argument  is not that the specific  forecasts  are correct,  but that they 
capture  the coming  shifts  in patterns  of participation  rates  and  the growth 
rate  of the labor  force.  I believe  that  these  changes  will occur-and  soon; 
but  it is not possible  to predict  the transition  point. 
Discussion 
A NUMBER  of participants  questioned  whether  participation  rates  for fe- 
males would return  to their  former  trends  when Wachter's  RP, variable 
does. James Tobin reasoned  that the new conceptions  about the role of 
women  in society  would lead new young  cohorts  to participate  in the la- 
bor force at least as intensively  as their  predecessors.  James  Duesenberry 
pointed out that the expanded  job opportunities  in many occupations 
formerly  closed to women  produced  an upward  ratchet  effect  in women's 
participation,  regardless  of changes  in other  factors  influencing  their  work- 
leisure  decision.  In the same  connection,  Frank  Schiff  noted  the increased 
availability  of part-time  work, and Frederic  Mishkin  stressed  the avail- 
ability  of improved  birth-control  techniques.  In response  Wachter  argued 
that his equation  did not suggest a decline in the participation  rate of 
younger females. Rather, the rate of growth of the participation  rate Michael  L. Wachter  575 
would  slow dramatically.  In the context  of the model, the positive  time- 
trend  effect  outweighed  the anticipated  decline in RPy and the assumed 
return  of TFR  to the  2.1 level. 
Clharles  Holt complimented  Wachter  on trying  to get behind  the fac- 
tors  that  have  led to the observed  trend  in participation  rates.  He observed 
that  the poor record  of the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  in forecasting  par- 
ticipation  indicated  the need for research  in this area.  Holt distinguished 
three  separate  effects  in the movement  of participation  rates  through  time, 
each  of which  should  be modeled  to obtain  a full picture  of the participa- 
tion process: first, the effect of changing  mores, which would probably 
have to be captured  by a time trend;  second, the effect  of changes  in an 
individual's  age;  and  third,  the cohort  effect,  which  may  make  people  who 
happen  to be born at some one point in time have particular  experiences 
that leave a permanent  imprint  on their participation  behavior.  As an 
example  of the third,  cohort,  effect,  Holt mentioned  Schweitzer's  finding 
that people's  permanent  participation  rates were affected  by the unem- 
ployment  rate that prevailed  when they first entered  the labor market. 
Robert  Solow  pointed  out that  the effects  Wachter  identifies  with  his time- 
age  variable  should,  ideally,  be disentangled  into time, age, and  birthdate 
effects  (or into any two, implying  the third). This would  permit  the kind 
of distinctions  Holt described  and  would  provide  evidence  on whether  the 
results  of Wachter's  age-time  regressions  were  plausible. 
Marina  Whitman  noted that Wachter's  model implied  that a high un- 
employment  rate encouraged  labor-force  participation.  Arthur  Okun  in- 
quired  whether  Wachter's  results should not simply  be interpreted  as a 
backward-bending  supply  curve  for labor: the income  effects  of adversity 
in the labor  market  that push  the wife into the market  outweigh  the sub- 
stitution  effects  of trading  off leisure  for labor.  Wachter  agreed  with  these 
comments,  but mentioned  that  the supply  curve  was only backward  bend- 
ing  given  aspiration  levels.  This  is different  from  the static  definition  of the 
traditional  backward-bending  supply  curve. 
Several  participants  commented  on Wachter's  equation  specifications. 
George  Perry  noted the sensitivity  of the results  to the particular  con- 
struction  of the RP, variable  that  was used, and  was skeptical  about  using 
that  variable,  which  reflected  the relative  income  of the entire  16-34 age 
group,  in explaining  the behavior  of the several  individual  age-sex co- 
horts. Tobin commented  that the lagged dependent  variable  was pre- 
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behavior.  But as people  get older  it is not the same  people  who appear  in 
a particular  age-cohort  variable. 
Wachter  explained  that in choosing  his specifications  he had been se- 
verely constrained  by lack of certain  kinds of data. He argued  that the 
major  thrust  of his work was to include those cohort effects  that could 
be captured  using  the available  data.  To improve  on the ability  to forecast 
participation  behavior,  it is crucial that the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
provide  real cohort  data;  that  is, data  for each year  by single  year  of age. 
He noted  that  fertility  data are already  available  by age and  year. 